Mohammed Jibril, et ux., Individually and on Behalf of Their Minor Children Y. J. and O. J., et al. v. Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al.
AdministrativeLaw Arbitration DueProcess FifthAmendment FourthAmendment CriminalProcedure Securities JusticiabilityDoctri
Must plaintiffs establish standing to challenge the DHS TRIP redress process based on the likelihood of repetition of past harm, and must courts defer to agency assertions of lack of standing without factual discovery?
QUESTIONS PRESENTED The lower courts endorsed the agency defendants’ assertion that all seven Jibril family members lacked standing to sue for injunctive relief challenging the due process in the Department of Homeland Security’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (“DHS TRIP”) as applied to them. The Jibrils still do not know the factual basis for that asserted lack of standing. Question No. 1 presented: Do plaintiffs show a risk of future harm sufficient to establish standing to challenge the DHS TRIP redress process, based on the likelihood of repetition of past harm, in light of the ability of the government to place plaintiffs on or return plaintiffs to the Terrorist Screening Dataset at any time and for any reason, without notice? Question No. 2 presented: Do plaintiffs sufficiently show imminent future harm by establishing the need for future religious travel, even without specific dates and times, such as the intent to complete religiously mandated pilgrimages? Question No. 3 presented: Must plaintiffs and courts defer to factual bases behind an agency’s conclusory assertion that plaintiffs lack standing, or are those matters more appropriately addressed after factual discovery? a. If so, do courts exercise appropriate independent judgment when they defer to factual assertions that agencies allege show plaintiffs’ lack of standing, even where agencies never reveal the facts to plaintiffs before or during litigation?