When are pleadings sufficient to state a claim under Iqbal/Twombly standards?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. When are pleadings sufficient to state a claim under the standard set in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and applied in a broader context in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)? Did the courts below apply that standard appropriately here, where the Court found that the plaintiffs failed to plead information that was, by its nature, available to plaintiffs only after discovery? Is it time for the Court to revisit the controversial Iqgbal/Twombly pleading standards or limit their application? 2. Have employees who received a hearing only after an adverse employment action received adequate due process when they did not have an opportunity to challenge a new work requirement before being suspended for not meeting that requirement? 3. When is it proper for a court to deny leave to amend? Did the courts below deny it appropriately in this case, where the court indicated that plaintiffs pled a plausible case for violation of state law, but did not include stand-alone state law claims, and where the court acknowledged that a sham process for religious accommodations to a vaccine mandate would violate due process, and plaintiffs described the process and implied that it was a sham, but did not use the word “sham” to describe it until their reply brief?