Whether a trial judge must consider all viable alternatives to a mistrial before finding manifest necessity exists

QUESTION PRESENTED The Double Jeopardy Clause protects a defendant’s “valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.” Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978) (citations and quotations omitted). To protect that right, the government must prove there was “manifest necessity” for a mistrial declared over the defendant’s objection if it wishes to re-prosecute. Jd. at 505. This requirement “command[s]” trial judges to only declare a mistrial when “a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the determination that the ends of justice would not be served by a continuation of the proceedings.” United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971). The federal and state courts are deeply split on whether the “ends of public justice” are served by a mistrial when viable alternatives exist. Most courts hold they are not and require trial courts to consider all viable alternatives before declaring a mistrial. But several courts, including the court below, have adopted one of at least three variations on when trial courts need not consider alternatives. The question presented is: Whether a trial judge must consider all viable alternatives to a mistrial before finding manifest necessity exists. i STATEMENT OF