Whether the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause applies to out-of-court statements admitted as evidence against criminal defendants if the statements were created solely for the primary purpose of serving as trial testimony

QUESTION PRESENTED This Court has “variously described” the “category” of “testimonial statements” that give rise to a cross-examination right under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. Smith v. Arizona, 144 S. Ct. 1785, 1792 (2024). In the decision below, the New York Court of Appeals recognized only one of this Court’s various formulations of the test as valid: a statement is testimonial solely if it “was created for the primary purpose of serving as trial testimony.” Pet. App. la. The court thus held that a post-arrest report about Petitioner prepared by a State agent to determine Petitioner’s suitability for bail was properly admitted as evidence against him at his criminal trial—even though the report’s author was not made available for cross-examination. That ruling conflicts with the decisions of other courts that apply different tests. It also conflicts with Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), which held the Confrontation Clause was enacted to reach bail reports like Petitioner’s, even if they were not prepared “to produce evidence admissible at trial.” Id. at 44, 50. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause applies to out-of-court statements admitted as evidence against criminal defendants if, and only if, the statements were created for the primary purpose of serving as trial testimony. 2. Whether a post-arrest report prepared about a criminal defendant by an agent of the State for use in a criminal proceeding can be admitted as evidence against the defendant at trial, without providing a right to cross-examine the report’s author. @)