Whether school officials may presume substantial disruption or a violation of the rights of others from a student's silent, passive, and untargeted ideological speech simply because that speech relates to matters of personal identity, even when the speech responds to the school's opposing views, actions, or policies

QUESTION PRESENTED L.M. is a student whose public school promoted the viewpoint that sex and gender are limitless, based on personal identity, and have no biological foundation. The school invited students to voice their support for this view. But L.M. disagreed and responded by wearing a t-shirt to class that said “There are only two genders.” After the school censored him, he wore a protest t-shirt that said “There are [censored] genders.” Despite no past or present disruption, the school district prohibited both t-shirts. The district court upheld this censorship based on the rights-of-others prong in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The First Circuit affirmed based on Tinker’s prong, though it said L.M.’s tshirts likely failed the rights-of-others prong too, applying a novel test for ideological speech alleged to demean characteristics of personal identity. The First Circuit’s novel legal standard and analysis conflicts with this Court’s decisions and those of ten other circuits in a multitude of ways. The question presented is: Whether school officials may presume substantial disruption or a violation of the rights of others from a student’s silent, passive, and untargeted ideological speech simply because that speech relates to matters of personal identity, even when the speech responds to the school’s opposing views, actions, or policies.