What are the indicia of 'state actor'? And do they include action, entwinement and controlling authority?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED This case navigates the course of the state actor doctrine from Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee SSAA 531 U.S. 288 (2001), and Smith v. NCAA, 266 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2001), to Peltier v. Charter Day School, 37 F.4th 104 (2022). The entwinement test has been variously and illogically applied. Where in Christian Heritage Acad. v. Oklahoma SSAA, 483 F.3d 1025 (10th Cir. 2007), and Crane v. Indiana HSAA, 975 F.2d 1315 (7th Cir. 1992), the test applied to action, here, WVSSAC has not acted, is not slated to act, and has no role identified for it in this process. In Title IX determinations, the role of federal funding is variably determinative. See Parker v. Indiana HSAA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113395 (S.D. In. 2009); Johnny’s Icehouse, Inc. v. Amateur Hockey Ass’n, 134 F. Supp. 2d 965 (N.D. Ill. 2001). Here conversely, WVSSAC does not receive federal funds, has no ’controlling authority’ and yet is held to answer under Title IX. The questions presented here include the following: What are the indicia of ‘state actor’? And do they include action, entwinement and controlling authority? Is private industry aggrieved by a baseless conversion into state actor, complete with heretofore unknown legal duties and no immunities? Should courts be called upon to make state actor determinations within some meaningful, i reproduceable, predictable framework or process? Did the courts below apply this Court’s seven tests relative to West Virginia Secondary School Activities Commission (WVSSAC)? If they failed to do so, did they improperly convert this private corporation into ‘state actor’ for the first time in its 108-year history?