When government acts without notice in a way that seriously impacts the rights of citizens, does the lack of statutory and constitutionally required notice deprive the victim of property without due process of law?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The City of Santa Monica placed a “historic” designation on a home owned by Petitioner’s predecessor without ever providing notice of either the hearing or the outcome of the hearing. Proceeding without notice raises serious due process issues, both procedural and substantive, as well as a taking of property without just compensation. The California courts exacerbated the situation by taking “judicial notice” of “facts” contrary to the complaint and precluding discovery or trial on the merits, thus denying Petitioner the opportunity to expose the errors in those judicially noticed “facts.” Those courts then applied an extremely stringent statute of limitations that, in defiance of the Supremacy Clause (U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2), purported to eliminate federal constitutional claims. Question 1: When government acts without notice in a way that seriously impacts the rights of citizens, does the lack of statutory and constitutionally required notice deprive the victim of property without due process of law? Question 2: When a government agency seeks to declare property “historic” and then purports to rule on its own request, has it violated the property owner’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial? Question 3: Is certiorari necessary because California has (a) conflicted with this Court’s recent -iiSeventh Amendment analysis in SEC v. Jarkesy, 144 S.Ct. 2117 (2024) and Chrysafis v. Marks, 141 S.Ct. 2482 (2021) that people cannot be the judge in their own case; (b) conflicted with this Court’s recent decision in Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 144 S.Ct. 2440 (2024) regarding the accrual of causes of action and consequent application of statutes of limitation; (c) decided a case based on judicially noticed “facts” while denying either discovery or trial on the merits, conflicting with Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961); and (d) continues to ignore this Court’s line of regulatory takings decisions, based on Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), while charting its own more restrictive course on this federal constitutional issue for which this Court’s decisions provide a floor?