Whether the Ninth Circuit violated Supreme Court precedent by improperly weighing evidence and failing to draw justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmovant at summary judgment

QUESTIONS PRESENTED This Ninth Circuit’s decision affirming the Federal District Court’s order “reflected a clear misapprehension of summary judgment standards in light of [Supreme Court] precedents” — like what happened in Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 659, 184 8. Ct. 1861, 1868 (2014) , (per curiam). Ignoring Scafidi’s contradictory evidence from his sworn affidavits and answers to interrogatories violated procedural rules and Supreme Court “axiom[s]”, “general rule[s]”, and “fundamental principle[s]” governing summary judgment. /d., 134 8S. Ct. at 651, 656, 660. : ¢ Supreme Court precedents require that, “(t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all — justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Tolan, 184 S. Ct. at 1863 Ginternal quotation marks and alteration omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 8. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)). That did NOT happen here. « Supreme Court precedent requires that the court may not ignore the nonmovant’s evidence. Tolan, 572 U.S. at 657 (“By failing to credit evidence that contradicted some of its key factual conclusions, the court improperly ‘weigh[ed] the evidence’ and resolved disputed issues in favor of the moving party”). Here, the panel ignored Scafidi’s contradictory evidence. Thus, the QUESTIONS PRESENTED are as follows: 1. Whether the Ninth Circuit’s decision, clearly ignoring the nonmovant’s theories of prosecution and factual evidence set forth in his sworn affidavits and answers to interrogatories, violated the Supreme Court precedent regarding “the axiom that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, ‘[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to : be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be , drawn in his favor.” Tolan v. Cotton, supra, 134 S. Ct. at 1863, quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, 477 U.S. at 255... the court may not : ignore the plaintiffs’ evidence, which includes sworn affidavits and answers to interrogatories ... Tolan, 572 U.S. at 657 (“By failing to credit evidence that contradicted some of its key factual conclusions, the court improperly ‘weigh[ed] the evidence’ and resolved disputed issues in favor of the moving party”). 2. Whether the Ninth Circuit’s decision conflicts with Supreme Court precedent regarding the “general rule that a ‘judge’s function’ at summary judgment , is not ‘to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.’ Anderson, 477 U.S., at 249.summary judgment is appropriate only if ‘the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any ; material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law’ [FRCP] 56(@). ... a court must view the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the opposing party’ Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 US. 144, 157, 908. Ct. 1598 .. . (1970); see also Anderson, supra, at 255.” Tolan v. Cotton, supra, 184 S. Ct. at 1866. 3. Whether the Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case violated Supreme Court precedent regarding “the fundamental principle that at the summary judgment stage, reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.” Tolan v. Cotton, supra, 134 S. Ct. at 1868. 4. Whether this Court must exercise its supervisory power because this Ninth Circuit decision creates . intra-circuit conflict because it deliberately or recklessly ignored the former Ninth Circuit’s final decision that correctly reversed the district court’s prior clearly erroneous grant of summary judgment ; to the respondents when it concluded with regard to the same fabricated evidence and unlawful arrest issue(s) that “Scafidi’s allegations of ‘fabricated evidence, or other wrongful conduct undertaken in bad faith’ create a triable issue of material fact ; as to probable cause. If credited, Scafidi’s affidavit : establishes several acts of affirmative misconduct that could cause a reasonable juror to conclude that the police defendants acted in bad faith.” Sc