Should the Court resolve the circuit split over whether actions taken in violation of the bankruptcy automatic stay are void or merely voidable?

QUESTION PRESENTED Under the Bankruptcy Code, the commencement of a bankruptcy case triggers an “automatic stay’—a statutory injunction proscribing various acts involving property belonging to a debtor’s bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Numerous courts of appeals have long held that actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void. See, e.g., Soares v. Brockton Credit Union (In re Soares), 107 F.3d 969, 976 (1st Cir. 1997); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hirsch (In re Colonial Realty Co.), 980 F.2d 125, 137 (2d Cir. 1992); Far Out Prods., Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 995 (9th Cir. 2001); Ellis v. Consol. Diesel Elec. Corp., 894 F.2d 371, 372 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. White, 466 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir. 2006). In contrast, other courts of appeals (including the court below) have long held that actions taken in violation of the stay are not void, but merely voidable. See, e.g., Sikes v. Glob. Marine, Inc., 881 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1989); Bronson v. United States, 46 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Easley v. Pettibone Mich. Corp., 990 F.2d 905, 911 (6th Cir. 1993). The question presented is: Should the Court grant certiorari to resolve a longstanding, entrenched, and acknowledged conflict among the courts of appeals over whether actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void or merely voidable?