Whether the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated when the State elicited testimony from a witness who repeatedly invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, thereby allowing the State to introduce the witness's statements without subjecting them to cross-examination.

QUESTION PRESENTED The State knew Mr. Lawrence Guydell Pierre, an admitted principal to Ms. Chateri Payne’s murder and an alleged co-conspirator, would invoke his Fifth Amendment rights when “testifying” before the jury. Nonetheless, the State asked substantive questions of Mr. Pierre at trial. This also forced Mr. Tre'veon Demarcus Anderson’s and Mr. Glynn Frierson’s attorneys to engage in limited substantive questioning of Mr. Pierre. Mr. Pierre repeatedly invoked his Fifth Amendment rights in front of the jury. This allowed the State to tender questions “establishing” substantive elements of its case through Mr. Pierre’s testimony, which “testimony” the State knew would not counter its theory of Mr. Anderson’s guilt. Thus, Mr. Anderson’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him was violated. See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1965) This Court should reverse Mr. Anderson’s convictions, vacate his sentences, and remand this matter to the First Judicial District Court for further proceedings consistent with this Court’s decision. Unless this Court addresses this constitutional violation, defendants will be subject to convictions based on “testimony” from prosecutors who ask leading questions to “prove” their case knowing full well witnesses will invoke their Fifth Amendment rights, allowing the prosecutor’s “testimony,” which will be immune from cross examination. This Court should grant this writ, correct this error, and provide guidance for a situation likely to weaken the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments absent action by this Court.