Whether 18 U.S.C. § 4248, consistent with both substantive and procedural due process, can be read to permit a civil commitment order to remain in effect if the Attorney General unilaterally removes the committed person to serve a punitive sentence such that upon completion of that criminal sentence, the earlier civil commitment order remains in force without any further judicial oversight as is otherwise expressly required by § 4248

QUESTION PRESENTED In United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010), this Court held that Congress had the constitutional authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact 18 U.S.C. § 4248, the Adam Walsh Act’s provision permitting the involuntary and indefinite civil commitment of “sexually dangerous” federal prisoners who would otherwise be released from Bureau of Prisons custody at the end of their sentences. Comstock expressly reserved—and this Court has yet to address—whether the Act’s civil commitment procedures comply with the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process clause. 560 U.S. at 149-150 (2010) (“We do not reach or decide any claim that the statute or its application denies . . . procedural or substantive due process, or any other rights guaranteed by the Constitution.”). This case presents the fundamental issues reserved in Comstock. The question presented is: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 4248, consistent with both substantive and procedural due process, can be read to permit a civil commitment order to remain in effect if the Attorney General unilaterally removes the committed person to serve a punitive sentence such that upon completion of that criminal sentence, the earlier civil commitment order remains in force without any further judicial oversight as is otherwise expressly required by § 4248. H