Whether the five trespasser respondents with primary responsibility for their jurisdiction across 22 years acting in the complete absence of power conferred by law, due to intentional violation by a creditor (officer of that court) of the automatic stay, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(k)(1) and 524(a)(1)(2) renders the state case 02LA03236 'void ab initio' as held by some Circuit Courts (1st,2nd;9th, 10th) of the United States or is the case voidable as held by (3rd,5th,6th, 11th) Circuit Courts of the United States?

Questions Presented Question One: Whether the five trespasser respondents with primary responsibility for their jurisdiction across 22 years acting in the complete absence of power conferred by law, due to intentional violation by a creditor (officer of that court) of the automatic stay, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(k)(1) and 524(a)(1)(2) renders the state case 02LA03236 “void ab initio” as held by some Circuit Courts (1st,2nd;9th, 10th) of the United States or is the case voidable as held by (3rd,5th,6th, 11th) Circuit Courts of the United States? Question Two: Whether the five trespasser respondents in their alleged judicial action with no power conferred by law ever, in 02LA03236 here for twenty-two years, have acted in Quo Warranto, unlawfully exercising a state office in the absence of power conferred by law per Chief Justice definition in Ames v Kansas, 111 U.S. 449 (1888), opinion of this Court? Question Three: Has the Kansas Supreme Court abused discretion/violated the law, where relief from void judgment is mandatory when Rule 60 (b)(4) (accord. K.S.A. 60-260 (b)(4)) [asserted before John McEntee] is applicable to the void judgment per the Ks Sup. Ct. allowing the null and void judgment to stand in violation of their mandatory duty arising under the Constitution to vacate and set aside the void judgment? Question Four: Can a debtor whose federal injunctive rights under intentional violation of the automatic stay and then per the enjoinment of process under section 524 (a)(1)(2) are already violated on the point or points of U.S. law as arising under the Constitution, be under requirement to reopen a bankruptcy case for ; . enforcement of the federal law’s injunction and demand action for civil contempt also in view of 11 U.S.C. § 105? Question Five: Is a requirement to reopen the bankruptcy as held by some circuits, district and bankruptcy courts, a violation of due process and equal protection, potentially forcing costly re-litigation of settled matters, on points of federal law arising under the Constitution? Question Six: If 11 U.S.C. § 524 (a) being a federal injunction do states’ district, appellate and Supreme Courts and all federal courts have to obey the injunction, and vacate a void judgment as result, of being decided by a court aside from the | bankruptcy court, without any further order from a federal court? Question Seven: Does registering a void judgment, per the intentional violation of the automatic stay 11 U.S.C. 362 and/or discharged debt per 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1)(2) in an opposing state and circuit negatively affecting the commerce clause of the Constitution [Article 1, Section 3] “fraud on the states” (?) and does such violation invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction, for determination of fraud, concerning Article I Section 3, where the injunction arises as a fraudulent matter between states under the “full faith and credit clause” and under the Constitution also per Article 1 and at Section 8? . 4 . Question Eight: Is this a case where a creditor filed a judgment inalocalcourtin the “abuse” Congress intended to enjoin, as per In Re Hamilton, No. 07-6269. (Sixth Cir. 2008) in passing the 11 U.S.C. 524 (a) injunction into law as arising under the Constitution? Question Nine: Whether H. Kent Hollins (deceased) and accordingly, Hollins and McVay, Kendall McVay, Gregory Blume and Karen Nations (all notified as proven) have conducted a malicious prosecution across 22 years, under the cooperating _ limited action courts in absence of any jurisdiction whatsoever? Question Ten: Does the statutory language of 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) reveal : Congress’ intent by implication that status of a case of intentionally violated automatic stay is to be deemed void ab initio, rather than voidable stating one so violated and injured “shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.”? Question Eleven: Based on the Court’s answer in qu