Whether Rule 32.1 or Rule 32 governs the procedural timing of sentencing following supervised release revocation

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b) defines the procedure for supervised release revocation hearings. The Ninth Circuit has split from other circuits by concluding that Rule 32.1(b) also provides the procedure for sentencing following revocation. Compare United States v. Reyes-Solosa, 761 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Rule 32.1 is not silent on the subject of timing [of revocation sentencing]”), with United States v. Waters, 158 F.3d 933, 943 (6th Cir. 1998) (Rule 32.1 is “silent with respect to the sentencing phase of [a] revocation hearing”). According to the Ninth Circuit, Rule 32.1(b)’s requirement that a revocation hearing take place within a reasonable time also extends to revocation sentencings. Other circuits, on the other hand, suggest that Rule 32(b)(1)’s requirement that any sentencing occur “without unnecessary delay” also applies to revocation sentencing hearings. The question presented by this appeal is whether, and to what extent, Rule 32.1 or Rule 32 governs revocation sentencing procedures. ii Statement of