Whether trial counsel's failure to investigate, uncover, and present evidence of defendant's reduced moral culpability may be categorically discounted based on conjecture that a jury might have concluded the evidence was double-edged, thereby foreclosing a conclusion that the defendant was prejudiced?

QUESTION PRESENTED Devin Bennett’s trial counsel counted on a manslaughter plea agreement that fell apart just days before trial when Bennett refused to say he harmed his son intentionally. Because trial counsel was banking on either a plea agreement or an acquittal, counsel conducted no mitigation investigation or preparation for the sentencing phase of trial. Given counsel’s admitted deficiency, the jury that sentenced Bennett to death never had the opportunity to learn about his childhood with parents who were addicts, mentally ill, and violent, and Bennett’s own mental health issues and stints in homeless shelters. In state post-conviction, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that, under Strickland v. Washington, it is “arguable that counsel fell below the standard of a minimally competent attorney.” Even so, when assessing prejudice, the Mississippi Supreme Court continued its disturbing trend of discounting mitigation unearthed in post-conviction relating to the defendant’s reduced moral culpability simply because the court could imagine some downside to that evidence. The question presented is: Whether trial counsel’s failure to investigate, uncover, and present evidence of defendant’s reduced moral culpability may be categorically discounted based on conjecture that a jury “might have” concluded the evidence was “double-edged,” thereby foreclosing a conclusion that the defendant was prejudiced? i