Whether the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b), through its use of the term 'in return for' requires some nexus or correlation between the unlawful benefit accepted and a specific official act to be performed

QUESTION PRESENTED Sheriff McCabe was convicted of honest services mail fraud and Hobbs Act extortion based on bribery as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) which prohibits a public official from accepting anything of value in return for being influenced in the performance of any official act. The Indictment charged a retainer-style bribery with campaign contributions and gifts accepted in exchange for official acts on an “as-needed basis.” At trial there was no instruction on corrupt intent and rather than instructing on the statutory language “in return for,” the jury was instructed that “a given thing of value need not be correlated with a specific official action” rather items of value “may be given with the intent to retain a public official’s services on an as-needed basis so that as the opportunities arise the public official would take specific official action on the payor’s behalf.” Pet.App.A43, and A85-86. The court of appeals affirmed finding the instructions to be a “correct statement of the applicable law.” Pet.App. A41. The question presented is: Whether the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b), through its use of the term “in return for” requires some nexus or correlation between the unlawful benefit accepted and a specific official act to be performed. i