Whether minimal sentencing advocacy that fails to meaningfully challenge the prosecution's sentencing recommendation constitutes a complete denial of counsel under Cronic

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW In United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984), this Court recognized that where “complete denial of counsel” occurs prejudice due to ineffective of counsel can be presumed. Furthermore, “if the process loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated.” Id. at 656-657. Thus, “if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable.” Id. at 659. In this case, Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial on numerous counts related to health care fraud. When proceedings turned to sentencing, his sentencing counsel failed to make any meaningful objections to the Presentence Investigation Report, did not argue for the district court to impose any particular sentence on Petitioner — who faced centuries in prison — and said only that “I have every confidence that the Court will fashion a sentence . . . that is sufficient but not greater than necessary pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553.” The question presented in this Petition is whether such minimal sentencing advocacy is the kind of failure to “subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversary testing” that “makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreasonable,” entitling Petitioner to relief under Cronic. -1 II.