When a § 2255 petitioner demonstrates through a retroactive constitutional rule that he is innocent, must an otherwise valid collateral-attack waiver foreclose habeas relief — despite that innocence?

QUESTION PRESENTED Nearly all federal criminal cases end in a guilty plea. In many of those pleas, the defendant signs an agreement promising not to file a future 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. But let’s say the law later changes through a new substantive rule of constitutional law, like the rule in United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 455 (2019), where the Court held that the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is unconstitutional. In this setting, a defendant suddenly stands convicted and sentenced for an act that is no longer a crime. His conduct does not violate the elements of the crime — he is factually innocent. When a petitioner files a § 2255 motion, then, what shall a court make of the collateral-attack waiver? This Court has crafted actual innocence “gateways” to excuse procedural default, Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15, 327-28 (1995), and to excuse a failure to comply with AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 392 (2013). In this case, we ask the Court to bless a third gateway, one that allows an innocent habeas petitioner to bypass a plea agreement’s collateral-attack waiver. When a § 2255 petitioner demonstrates through a retroactive constitutional rule that he is innocent, must an otherwise valid collateral-attack waiver foreclose habeas relief — despite that innocence?