Question not identified.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV (emphasis added). The requirement is satisfied where “the description is such that the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended.” Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925). “In applying this requirement to searches aimed at residences within multi[-Junit buildings, such as the search in the present case, courts have declared invalid those warrants that fail to describe the targeted unit with enough specificity to prevent a search of all the units.” Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 90 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For example, in Garrison, when officers and the search warrant failed to recognize that the third floor of an apartment had two separate apartments, not one, the search was valid only because the officers reacted to the information learned at the scene and refrained from searching the incorrect apartment on that floor. Jd. at 86-89. In this case, officers obtained a search warrant for an apartment in a four-unit building. The affidavit submitted in support asserted that the door to the apartment would be marked with the letter B on the door. The affidavit referred to unit or apartment ““B” 12 times. The warrant described the unit as being marked with a “‘B” but on the second floor. Petitioner had never been seen leaving an apartment on the second floor. He had been seen entering a door on the first floor and reappearing with drugs. When officers arrived on the scene, the special weapons unit had busted down a door that was not marked with a “B.” And yet the officers entered and searched anyway, without looking to see if any other unit was marked with a “B.” Evidence showed that there was an apartment door on the first floor marked with a “B.” The first question, then, is whether the state courts errs and rules contrary to this Court’s precedent in failing to find that a warrant fails to describe the place to be searched with sufficient particularity and therefore a high probability existed that the wrong residence would be searched. An invalid warrant does not lead to suppression if the officers reasonably believe the search warrant was valid. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984). In this case, by finding that the search was authorized, the state courts did not reach the question of whether the Leon good faith exception applied. Because the Court should accept this case for review and find that the search was invalid, Leon would become relevant. The officer that investigated the case and crafted the affidavit leading to the search warrant was on the scene of the execution of that warrant. He was the officer that was told by confidential informants that the apartment to be searched would be marked with a “B” on the door. He could not have reasonably believed that the warrant was valid when he reached the scene and discovered that the door of the apartment to be searched was not marked B, especially when evidence introduced in the case showed that another apartment was marked with a B and the officer admitted that he did not bother to look around at other apartments on the day of the search or afterward. Accordingly, the second question is whether the Leon good faith exception would not apply so that exclusion of the evidence would be required. i