Whether in the post-Chevron era, a district court can issue a permanent lifetime ban through summary judgment by deferring to the FTC's interpretation of MITOR

QUESTION PRESENTED In Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 8. Ct. 2244 (2024), this Court overturned one of the foundational tenets of administrative law: a common law judicial doctrine that guided judges for forty years and affected the outcome of over 18,000 federal judicial opinions, the Chevron doctrine.! This petition presents for review a summary judgment decision that hinged on the now-abandoned Chevron precedent. Petitioners respectfully request this Court to issue a GVR order (grant, reverse, and remand order) directing the district court that issued the summary judgment and the Ninth Circuit that affirmed to reconsider their decisions based on Loper Bright. Without the Chevron doctrine’s judicially mandated deference, actions and interpretations of federal agencies must now be scrutinized in a new light, along with any judicial opinion which plainly defers to agency judgment without attempting to use its own. The question presented is: Whether in the post-Chevron era, the district court can issue a permanent lifetime ban through summary judgment on a company for alleged violations of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act and the Federal Trade Commission’s Mail, Internet, or Telephone Order Merchandise Rule (MITOR) by simply deferring to the 1 The Chevron doctrine, a foundational principle of U.S. administrative law, was established in the 1984 U.S. Supreme Court case Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In Chevron, the Court set forth a two-step test for determining when courts should defer to an administrative agency's interpretation of a_ statute it administers. ii FTC’s own interpretation of MITOR and _ its application?