Does the Court's decision in Ramirez change the diligence standard for developing factual bases in state court procedurally barred petitions?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In his petition for writ of habeas corpus before the district court, Petitioner Michael McLaughlin raised the claim that his trial counsel ineffectively failed to investigate and present a voluntary intoxication defense. In 2016, the Ninth Circuit held that McLaughlin established cause and prejudice under Martinez to overcome the procedural default of this claim based on new declarations McLaughlin presented to the state courts in a second postconviction proceeding. The case was remanded to the district court, which held an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, McLaughlin presented new evidence to establish deficient performance and prejudice. Despite this showing, the district court denied the petition. After McLaughlin filed his opening brief with the Ninth Circuit and before Respondents filed their answering brief, this Court decided Shinn v. Ramirez, 142 596 U.S. 366 (2022). The Ninth Circuit held, based on Ramirez, that McLaughlin failed to properly develop the factual basis of his claim in state court, and, as a result, the federal court could not consider his new evidence to excuse the procedural default in state court or to consider the merits of the underlying claim. The questions presented are: 1. In Michael Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 435 (2000), this Court held diligence requires a petitioner to make a “reasonable attempt” to develop the factual basis of a claim in state court; however, diligence “does not depend... upon whether those efforts could have been successful.” Does the Court’s decision in Ramirez change the Michael Williams inquiry for diligence such that a petitioner i must do more than make a “reasonable attempt” to develop the factual basis of a claim in state court in a procedurally barred petition? 2. Did the Ninth Circuit err in concluding, contrary to other courts of appeals that have decided the question and this Court’s precedent, that a court may not consider new evidence when deciding whether a petitioner has established cause and prejudice under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012)? ii