Did the Ninth Circuit correctly apply this Court's decision in Ramirez?

QUESTION PRESENTED Between 1948 and 2022, this Court applied the same standard for excusing a state prisoner’s procedural default of a claim for relief as it applied to allow factual development of that claim in federal habeas proceedings. But when this Court decided Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366 (2022), it decoupled those standards. Cause and prejudice, under the rubric of Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), and Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), remains the standard for excusing a procedural default of a state prisoner’s claim if the default is based on an adequate and independent ground in state law. But whether factual development in federal habeas proceedings is allowed depends, to begin with, whether the prisoner has “failed to develop” the claim in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). And that depends on whether the prisoner has been diligent in developing the factual basis of the claim in state court proceedings. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000). Here, the Ninth Circuit relinked the two standards, and held that a state court’s procedural-bar ruling forever barred factual development of the claim, no matter how diligent the prisoner’s efforts were in state court. Did the Ninth Circuit correctly apply this Court’s decision in Ramirez?