Whether Supreme Court precedent establishes an exception to attorney-client confidentiality privilege when defense counsel determines a need to disclose privileged communications?

QUESTION PRESENTED The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed Mr. Jenkins’s initial conviction because his defense attorney, without discussion with her client, told the judge and prosecutor about confidential statements disclosed to a defense psychologist that were within the attorneyclient privilege. State v. Jenkins, 190 Or. App. 542, 79 P.3d 347 (2003). After the prosecutors secured a change in the scope of the attorney-client privilege from the legislature, the prosecutors used those same statements to convict Mr. Jenkins in a second trial over defense objections that the disclosure violated the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel, relying on authority including Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986). After Mr. Jenkins filed for federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the Ninth Circuit approved the attorney’s conduct of revealing privileged communications, stating “Jenkins does not point to any case that would have required [defense counsel] to consult with her client prior to disclosure.” The question presented is: Does clearly established Supreme Court precedent establish that defense counsel renders ineffective assistance of counsel by disclosing information protected by the attorney-client privilege without first consulting with the client to determine whether an exception to confidentiality applied?