Whether a reasonable jurist could debate the district court's dismissal of a 'gateway innocence' claim based on new exculpatory evidence and scientific testimony undermining the prosecution's case

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), this Court recognized and endorsed a miscarriage of justice exception to the general principle that defaulted claims cannot be reviewed in federal habeas proceedings. This equitable exception requires demonstrating a credible claim of innocence through “new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Id. at 324. A petitioner meets the threshold showing if they demonstrate that, “in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find [them] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jd. at 327-28. Once the exception is met, the otherwise defaulted claims can be reviewed on the merits. Petitioner presented “new reliable evidence,” including exculpatory DNA evidence and unrefuted scientific evidence debunking the prosecution’s forensic evidence at trial. The district court denied Petitioner’s Sch/up gateway innocence claim, dismissing Petitioner’s new evidence as “[a]t best . . . equivocal of guilt,” and crediting less probative evidence of guilt: an unreliable cross-racial identification and isolated post-sentencing inculpatory statements made by Petitioner in the course of parole proceedings. As a result, the district court never reached the merits of Petitioner’s underlying constitutional claim. The Fourth Circuit declined to grant a certificate of appealability. The questions presented are: (1) Whether a reasonable jurist could debate the district court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s “gateway innocence” claim where Petitioner presented “new reliable evidence,” including exculpatory DNA evidence and expert scientific evidence debunking the government’s forensic testimony at trial, which together, completely undermined the State’s theory of the case and affirmatively established that Petitioner did not commit the crime in question, and where the district court discounted Petitioner’s “new reliable evidence,” and erroneously over-credited an unreliable cross-racial identification and inculpatory post-sentencing statements made by Petitioner while speaking to the parole board. (2) Whether jurists of reason would find it debatable whether Petitioner’s habeas petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right where the Commonwealth presented unreliable and scientifically invalid hair and fiber evidence at trial. i