Did the Utah Supreme Court violate binding case law by improperly assessing Strickland deficient performance and prejudice in a death penalty case involving a murder and rape?

QUESTION PRESENTED CAPITAL CASE Nearly forty years ago, Respondent Douglas Lovell kidnapped, raped, and sodomized Joyce Yost. Because Yost reported the rape and testified at Lovell’s preliminary hearing, Lovell kidnapped and murdered her, burying her somewhere in the Wasatch Mountains. Nearly ten years ago, a jury sentenced Lovell to death for his aggravated murder of Yost. Remorse was a central theme of Lovell’s mitigation case, presented primarily through three of his former ecclesiastical leaders—volunteer clergy in The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church)—and other religious-themed witnesses. The Utah Supreme Court vacated Lovell’s death sentence and ordered a new sentencing proceeding because it determined that defense counsel did not adequately object to the State’s cross-examination of one of these witnesses about the sincerity and authenticity of Lovell’s alleged remorse. Without any analysis of the facts and circumstances of Lovell’s crime, or the eleven proved aggravating factors, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the jurors were encouraged by the State’s cross-examination of Lovell’s ecclesiastical leader to forfeit their assessment of Lovell’s remorse—and by extension their ultimate sentencing decision—to Church leadership. The Question Presented is: Did the Utah Supreme Court violate this Court’s binding case law when it failed to (1) ii properly assess Strickland deficient performance by considering the range of legitimate strategic reasons defense counsel may have had for not objecting to the State’s cross-examination of one of Lovell’s former ecclesiastical leaders, and (2) properly assess Strickland prejudice when, even assuming deficient performance, it failed to reweigh the totality of the aggravating and mitigating factors that still would have been before the jury absent any error by counsel?