Whether the four-month period for determining competency under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1) begins at commitment or upon arrival at a Bureau of Prisons hospital

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW In 1972, this Court made it clear that a criminal defendant who may not be competent to stand trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether the accused is competent or “whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.” Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). “[D]ue process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.” Id. In 1984, those due process concerns were codified into federal law when Congress passed The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 CIDRA”), Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057 (1984), 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4247. The IDRA provides in pertinent part that once a court has found that a criminal defendant is not competent to stand trail: [T]he court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General. The Attorney General shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment in a suitable facility — (1) For such a reasonable period, not to exceed four months, as is necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1) (emphasis added). Question Presented: Whether, given the structure of § 4241(d)(1) and in light of Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), the four-month period of 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1) begins when the district court commits the accused to the custody of the Attorney General or when the accused arrives at the Bureau of Prisons hospital? i INTERESTED PARTIES There are no