Whether the Fourteenth Amendment's equal-protection clause requires heightened scrutiny for gender-based classifications that claim non-prejudiced rationales

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Three years ago, Texas launched “Operation Lone Star,” a initiative to regulate immigration at the state level. As part of the operation, the state charges noncitizens found near the border with criminal trespass. The state chose to use special detention facilities dedicated to the operation, and it decided to use facilities that could house men but not women. Because of its choice of detention space, the state prosecuted only men for trespassing. One of the thousands of men found trespassing was Petitioner. He was found with a mixed-sex group. Petitioner and the other men found were arrested and prosecuted. But the women were not. Petitioner raised a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal-protection clause. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Petitioner’s claim. The majority held that scrutiny under the equal-protection clause was triggered only when the state distinguished between the sexes “based on a prejudiced viewpoint.” (Pet. App. 6a—7a). And the state, the majority reasoned, hadn’t refused to prosecute women based on prejudice but based on its choice of detention space. In dissent, Judge Keel contended that the equal-protection clause required scrutiny whenever the state treated the sexes differently, even if those differences didn’t stem from a “prejudiced viewpoint.” (Pet. App. 12a). The two questions presented are: 1. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal-protection clause requires scrutiny when the state treats men and women differently for purportedly non-prejudiced reasons. 2. Whether this Court should hold this case pending resolution of United States v. Skrmetti (No. 23-477). ii STATEMENT OF