No. 24-6292

Shannon L. Cotton v. United States

Lower Court: Seventh Circuit
Docketed: 2025-01-14
Status: Denied
Type: IFP
Response WaivedIFP
Tags: criminal-sentencing fair-sentencing-act felony-classification first-step-act statutory-interpretation supervised-release
Key Terms:
JusticiabilityDoctri
Latest Conference: 2025-02-21
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Whether the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) requires a district court to determine the current classification of a defendant's felony by looking to what his 'offense is' at the time of revocation or whether the court must look to what the 'conviction is' or 'offense was' at the time of the original judgment

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

This Court has consistently held “that the ordinary meaning of the language chosen by Congress accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership , 564 U.S. 91, 101 (2011) . It has repeatedly cautioned against rewriting statutes, even when Congress’s plain language yields objectionable or absurd results. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc. , 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) ; Lamie v. United States Trustee , 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004) .The language of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) is clear and unambiguous. When a criminal defendant’s term of supervised release is revoked, the statutory maximum sentence that may be imposed upon revocation is determined by what class of felony the defendant’s original “offense . . . is.” 18 U.S.C. §3 583(e)(3). In 2007, Shannon Cotton pled guilty to what was, at the time, a Class A felony for distribution of five grams or more of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and (b)(1)(B). In 201 0, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act , which altered the amount of crack cocaine needed to trigger 21 U.S.C. §841(b)(1)(B), increasing the threshold from five ( 5) grams to twenty -eight ( 28) grams. In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act, which made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactively applicable at courts’ discretion. Under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act, Mr. Cotton’s sentence was reduced from 262 months to 188 months. After being released from custody, Mr. Cotton violated the terms of his supervised release in 2022. In 2023, he was sentenced to two -years in prison by the district court under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) . ii The question presented is: Whether the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) requires a district court to determine the current classification of a defendant’s felony by looking to what his “offense is” at the time of revocation or whether the court must look to what the “conviction is” or “offense was” at the time of the original judgment.

Docket Entries

2025-02-24
Petition DENIED.
2025-01-30
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 2/21/2025.
2025-01-22
Waiver of United States of right to respond submitted.
2025-01-22
Waiver of right of respondent United States to respond filed.
2025-01-02
Petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed. (Response due February 13, 2025)

Attorneys

Shannon Cotton
Tom DrysdaleFederal Public Defender, Petitioner
Tom DrysdaleFederal Public Defender, Petitioner
United States
Elizabeth B. PrelogarSolicitor General, Respondent
Sarah M. HarrisActing Solicitor General, Respondent
Sarah M. HarrisActing Solicitor General, Respondent