Descart Austin Begay, Jr. v. United States
Did the 2014 amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) supplant this Court's decision in Tome to permit introduction of a declarant witness's prior consistent statements made after the witness developed a motive to lie even where the witness was impeached under a charge that her testimony was a fabrication based on improper influence or motive?
Subsection (i) of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) allows for admission of a declarant’s prior consistent statement only when offered “to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying.” In 2014, the Rule wa s amended to add a subsection (ii) that broaden ed the admission of prior consistent statements to situations beyond recent fabrications or improper influences or motives, b ut critically, the amendment retained the requirement that an offered consistent statement must have been made before the alleged fabrication or improper influence or motive arose. Fed. R. Evid. 801 (Advisory Committee’s Note to 2014 Amendment (citing Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 1 50 (1995)) ). The Eighth Circuit, in direct conflict with the Fifth Circuit, held that in so called “mixed” situations involving impeachment that could be categorized under both subsection s (i) and (ii) of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the general preference of admiss ion rather than exclusion necessitates a bright -line rule admitting prior consistent statements even where they would be otherwise inadmissible under subsection (i). The question presented is: Did the 2014 amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) supplant this Court ’s decision in Tome to permit introduction of a declarant witness’s prior consistent statements made after the witness developed a motive to lie even where the witness was impeached under a charge that her testimony was a fabrication based on improper influence or motive?