Did the Arizona Supreme Court deprive Mr. Montoya of the right to an impartial jury and to due process of law when it affirmed the trial court's denial of his motion to strike a biased juror for cause?

Did the Arizona Supreme Court deprive Mr. Montoya of the right to an impartial jury and to due process of law guaranteed to him under the Fifth, Sixth , and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution when it affirmed the trial court’s denial of his motion to strike a biased juror for cause, thereby misapplying Morgan v. Illinois , 504 U.S. 719 (1992) ; conflating this Court’s precedent governing elimination of death leaning jurors in Morgan and its progeny, with precedent governing elimination of life leaning jurors in Witherspoon v. Illinois , 391 U.S. 510 (1968), and its progeny; and relying upon a footnote that was abrogated by this court in Wainwright v. Witt , 469 U.S. 412 (1985) ? Does Arizona’s elimination of peremptory strikes require a more heightened standard of scrutiny in capital cases than was applied to such challenges prior to Arizona’s elimination of peremptory strikes ?