Whether a Middle-Eastern Iranian is considered a race under §1981 and what evidence is needed to prove racial discrimination in academic tenure decisions

Questions Presented The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, was designed to eliminate discrimination in all employment levels; however, in the academic institution of higher education, two decisions by this Court ordered deference to a university’s academic judgment that was based on “genuine professional judgment.” Bd. of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978); Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985). Ever since, courts have shown considerable deference to academic judgments ; even in intentional discrimination cases brought by faculty challenging denials of promotion or tenure, often dismissing the lawsuit or awarding summary judgment to the institution by dismissing all the evidence as insufficient in every step of the plaintiffs analysis of the discrimination or the breach of contract claims, rendering the statue ineffective. . The questions presented are: Under §1981, is a Middle-Eastern Iranian a race? What evidence or characteristics does an appellant need to provide to prove his race? How to determine if an employer'sreference to the employee’s protected trait when making an unfavorable employment decision is direct discrimination? How to define "similarly situated" to show pretext at institutions of higher education with a tenure system, and if the Eleventh Circuit's examples of "a valid comparison" should be adopted by other courts to eliminate the arbitrary definition of “similarly situated" comparators by the courts? What determines if the university's published tenure i and promotion guidelines (T&P) and procedures are binding and if the post-hoc depositions of exuniversity officials override the university's published guidelines and procedures? Finally, under ; §1981, should one read the discrimination broadly. to include a retaliation theory? In particular, because there is no separate provision of section 1981 that : prohibits retaliation, where it is difficult for any litigant (mainly a pro se plaintiff) to discern that theory, do they need to plead retaliation in a separate count in the complaint? . . ii