Question not identified.

I. Whether a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death but can be committed by failing to take action, has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, thereby qualifying as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) . This question is raised Delligatti v. United States , No. 23 -825, a case currently pending before this Court on which argument was heard on November 12, 2024 . II. Whether murder in aid of racketeering (“VICAR murder”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1) , is an indivisible offense requiring a categorical analysis based on the generic federal definition of murder ( 18 U.S.C. § 1 (a)) or a divisible offense to which the modified categorical approach applies for crime of violence predicate analysis under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) . The Congressional Record is clear that Congress intended the generic definition of murder to apply to prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1959. Yet, the circuits are split on the application of § 1959 as a crime of violence predicate. Some circuits, including the Sixth, perform a categorical analysis, looking to the generic federal definition of murder. Others, including the First and Seco nd, perform a modified categorical analysis, looking to the elements of the charged state offense predicate. Courts in the T enth Circuit say that a conviction under § 1959 must satisfy both the federal and the state definition of the charged crime. The Ninth Circuit has applied both the generic federal definition and the state offense ii predicate , in different opinions . The Fourth Circuit has disclaim ed application of the categorical approach altogether. The Court’s guidance is urgently needed to ensure uniformity in the application of federal law.