Whether the Sixth Amendment requires a prospective juror to make an unequivocal commitment to impartiality after revealing their actual bias

Alber t Pinedo was charged with attempted enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Mr. Pinedo argued that he was engaged in a consensual sexual fantasy involving age roleplay with an adult pretending to be a minor —a common coping mechanism for minor -attracted persons to avoid acting on their sexual desires and committing a crime. Jury selection for Mr. Pinedo’s trial proved difficult because so many prospective jurors had strong, negative feelings about the allegations and even the idea of homosexual fantasies involving age roleplay. Many of thos e venire members were excused, except for two. Before oral voir dire , the two prospective jurors privately filled out a 69 -question form and indicated they could be fair and impartial by checking the appropriate spaces next t o four generic fairness -related questions . During oral voir dire , however , the two prospective jurors made several statements expressing their actual bias es against not only the subject matter of the case, but also Mr. Pinedo’s anticipated defense. But neither juror gave a subsequent unequivocal commitment to remain fair and impartial —at most, one juror said he would try to be as impartial as he could be, and the other equivocated each time she was asked her about her ability to be fair . The defense moved to excuse both jurors for cause, but the district court denied the challenges, relying mostly on the jurors’ checkmarks on generic fairness -related questions on the pre-oral voir dire written questionnaire s. The two jurors were seated and ultimately decided to convict Mr. Pinedo. In a split decision, t he Ninth Circuit affirmed. These circumstances give rise to the following question presented: Whether the Sixth Amendment requires a prospective juror to make an unequivocal commitment to impartiality after revealing their actual bias. Statement of