Does 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) require a certificate of appealability for review of an order prematurely granting summary judgment against a habeas petition, effectively depriving the use of expert services?

(CAPITAL CASE) South Carolina sentenced Mr. Stanko to death in each of two trials, the first in G e o r g e t o w n C o u n t y , t h e s e c o n d i n H o r r y County. Before the Court is the federal habeas corpus application resultin g from the Horry County judgment. In the Georgetown County case, subsequently doubly disbarred trial counsel William Diggs pursued a strategy that was legally untenable and outside the professional norms of capital defense: a not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) defense predicated on anti-social persona lity disorder (ASPD) sabotaging available mitigating evidence, resulting in a conviction and death sentence. While Diggs was the subject of numerous post-conviction clai ms of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) in that case, the Horry County trial court appointed Diggs to repr esent Stanko again. The State moved to remove Diggs due to an unwaivable conflict. Despite Stanko’s known traumatic brain injuries and the failure to properly advise him of the consequences of the conflict, the trial court accepted Stan ko’s purported waiver. Diggs pursued the same legally untenable defense before the second jury, which he conducted at the expense of any credible mi tigation during the sentencing phase. In the Horry County post-conviction, the state courts repeatedly denied funding for expert services for presenting Stanko’s substantial brain damage. In habeas corpus, the District Court, under su pervision of the Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals, deemed such services “reaso nably necessary” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f). High-resolution brain imaging was finally conducted via the District Court’s transport authorization, but be fore the funded experts could even obtain the resulting data for analysis, that Court granted summ ary judgment dismissing the petition. The Fourth Circuit then deemed that a certif icate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) was needed for the non-final order depriving Stanko of these authorized expert services. Stanko asks this court to consider the following issues: 1. Does 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) requir e a certificate of appealability for review of an order prematurely gran ting summary judgment against the petition, effectively depriving the us e of expert services under § 3599? 2. a. Can a capital defendant waive his a ttorney’s actual conflict against him that adversely affects counsel’s representation? 2. b. Can a defendant suffering traumatic brain injury with related psychological impairments who is no t advised of to the consequences knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his capital counsel’s conflict against him?