Whether a trial judge operating under an erroneous belief about the nature of a defendant's crime violates the defendant's federal due process rights

is: WHETHER A TRIAL JUDGE, WHO OPERATES UNDER THE ERRONEOUS BELIEF, REFLECTED IN THE RECORD, INCLUDING THE JUDGE'S ORDERS, THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS COMMITTED A SEXUAL OFFENSE AS DEFINED UNDER STATUTORY LAW, PROVIDES THE DEFENDANT FEDERAL DUE PROCESS IN THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AS ALL THE JUDGE'S DECISIONS WERE CONTAMINATED BY HIS MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE STATUTORY NATURE OF THE ACCUSED’S CRIME. On appeal, contrary to Kentucky’s appellate procedures, as reflected in rules and decisional law, without prior notice, the Kentucky Supreme Court treated Ullman, as if he were an appellant, when throughout this appeal Ullman has always been the appellee, and explicitly held Ullman to preservation requirements only applicable to appellees and refused to accord him the procedural benefits of being an appellee, depriving Ullman of review of a claim that the -i Kentucky Supreme Court regarded as a palpable error potentially capable of creating a manifest injustice in Ullman’s probation revocation. Accordingly, the second question presented is: WHETHER A STATE APPELLATE COURT THAT, WITHOUT NOTICE, DEVIATES FROM ITS ESTABLISHED APPELLATE PROCEDURES AND DECISIONAL LAW TO DENY APPELLATE REVIEW OF A REASON IN THE RECORD THAT COULD JUSTIFY AFFIRMING THE RULINGS BELOW IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE DENIES THE APPELLEE THE FEDERAL GUARANTEE OF APPELLATE DUE PROCESS IN VIOLATION OF SMITH V. ROBBINS, 528 U.S. 259, 277 (2000), EVITTS V. LUCEY, 469 U.S. 387, 405 (1985), AND SWARTHOUT V. COOKE, 562 U.S. 216 (2011). “ii