Was it error for the Fourth Circuit to enforce Mr. Scarborough's appeal waiver to bar his sentencing appeal, and should this Court grant certiorari and reverse to correct an erroneous trend in the Fourth Circuit?

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(N) requires that, before a district court accepts a plea of guilty, it must first “inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands . . . the terms of any plea -agreement provision waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence.” Defendant Marshall Ray Scarborough pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement drafted by the government that, by its written terms, waived “the right to appeal the conviction and whatever sentence is imposed on any ground” and “the right to contest the conviction or the sentence in any post -conviction proceeding.” During the plea colloquy, however, the district court told Mr. Scarborough only that the plea agreement “waive[d] [his] right to appeal and waive[d] [his] right to contest the conviction at any post -conviction proceeding,” without unambiguously informing Mr. Scarborough —or ensuring that he understood —that the appeal waiver applied to the sentence yet to be imposed. Mr. Scarborough appealed his sentence. The government moved to dismiss based on the appeal waiver, and the Fourth Circuit granted the motion without discussing the flawed colloquy. The Fourth Circuit has similarly enforced appeal waivers based on nearly identical colloquies in several other cases. Other circuits have held appeal waivers unenforceable under the same or similar circumstances. The question presented is: Was it error for the Fourth Circuit to enforce Mr. Scarborough’s appeal waiver to bar his sentencing appeal, and should this Court grant certiorari and reverse to correct an erroneous trend in the Fourth Circuit?