Whether courts can establish a clear methodology for assessing fair representation of distinctive groups in jury selection and what constitutes systematic underrepresentation

In 1879 this Court stated the obvious: racial prejudice sways juries; preventing Black citizens from serving on jury panels is a clear denial of the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Strauder v. W. Va., 100 U.S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664 (1879). A hundred years later, this court distilled its fair-cross section and equal protection jurisprudence into a multi-factor test. A prima facia violation of the fair cross section requirement is shown by demonstrating: 1.The group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community; 2.The representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of persons in the community; 3.This underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S. Ct. 664 (1979). For the last half century, the lower courts have struggled to interpret and apply the second and third requirements. This Court has yet to provide clarity for the lower courts–it has accepted only one fair-cross section case, which ultimately left the underlying question unanswered. 1 This case presents this Court with the opportunity to clarify two pressing questions: 1.How should courts assess whether the representation of a group is fair and reasonable? 2.What is necessary to show an underrepresentation is “systematic”? 2