Whether the Florida Supreme Court's procedural interpretation of Hall v. Florida circumvents the categorical prohibition against executing intellectually disabled individuals

– CAPITAL CASE Jermaine Alexander Foster is an intellectually disabled man on Florida’s death row. In Florida, the categorical prohibition against the execution of the intellectually disabled has been circumvented via the Florida Supreme Court’s misinterpretation of Hall v. Florida , 572 U.S. 701 (2012), as constituting new, but non-retroactively applicable law, rather than an application of the established principle in Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S. 304 (2002). As a result, litigants like Mr. Foster who were granted the opportunity to present evidence demonstrating their intellectual disability , had their hearings revoked and have since been precluded from litigating their meritorious claims . The questions presented are: 1. Whether the categorical restriction against executing the intellectually disabled can be circumvented via procedural hurdles implemented after litigants were initially given the opportunity to prove their intellectual disability? 2. Whether the grants of authority in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) and Hall v. Florida , 570 U.S. 701 (2012) which permit states to determine procedures for implementing the categorical restriction against executing the intellectually disabled also permits states autonomy to redefine intellectual disability? 3. Whether the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation that Hall constitutes new, nonretroactively applicable law or is a n application of the established principle in Atkins within the meaning of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989), and Chaidez v. U.S. , 568 U.S. 342, 347 -48 (2013), contravenes this Court’s categorical prohibition against executing the intellectually disabled ?