If a person never had access to § 2254 to impugn the constitutionality of her state criminal proceeding, is § 1983 presumptively available (as in six circuits), or must she always use state law instead (as in five)?

Questions Presented Respondent Midland County prosecuted petitioner Erma Wilson with an active county prosecutor secretly working on her trial as the presiding judge’s law clerk. If Wilson had learned of that due process violation while in state custody, she could have sought relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 (the federal habeas corpus statute). But the county hid the violation until after Wilson’s sentence expired, making § 2254 unavailable. So she sued for damages under § 1983. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that § 1983 is also unavailable to Wilson under this Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and that she must go to state court for different relief instead. Six judges “emphatically” dissented. They called on this Court to resolve a “deep and enduring circuit split” regarding § 1983’s presumptive availability in Wilson’s circumstances. In five circuits, § 1983 is unavailable without regard for the lack of access to § 2254. But in six circuits, § 2254’s unavailability typically means § 1983’s availability. This Court has yet “to settle” that debate of statutory interpretation. Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 752 n.2 (2004). The questions presented are: 1. Ifa person never had access to § 2254 to impugn the constitutionality of her state criminal proceeding, is § 1983 presumptively available (as in six circuits), or must she always use state law instead (as in five)? 2. Is a § 1983 damages claim that impugns the constitutionality of a state criminal proceeding always analogous to a claim of malicious prosecution?