Does a sentencing court violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it invokes a defendant's lack of spirituality—while crediting the religious faith of others—as part of its rationale for imposing a death sentence?

A fundamental tenet of due process is that a criminal defendant may not be sentenced based on constitutionally impermissible considerations, including religious beliefs. See Zant v. Stephens , 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983). This principle is especially critical in capital cases, where the imposition of the ultimate penalty demands heightened procedural safeguards. See Woodson v. North Carolina , 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). Here, during the sentencing hearing, while explaining its decision to impose the death penalty, the trial court expressly referenced Mr. Emery’s remark from the guilt phase of trial that he was “not a spiritual person.” The court juxtaposed this remark with th e religious commitments of Mr. Emery’s son—highlighting the son’s missionary work and plans to become a Christian counselor. In sentencing Mr. Emery to death, the court credited the son’s mother for his moral development—despite no testimony about her religious beliefs—and used Mr. Emery’s lack of sp irituality to diminish his standing as a father, suggesting he was less deservin g of similar regard. By doing so, the court injected religious considerations into a proceeding that required impartiality. This case pres ents the following question: Does a sentencing court violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it invokes a defendant’s lack of spirituality—while crediting the reli gious faith of others—as part of its rationale for imposing a death sentence?