Did the lower federal courts violate the rule of Williams v. Taylor by attributing fault for not developing factual support of a claim in state court to Lee where a thorough social history investigation was critical to the ability of post-conviction relief counsel to establish ineffective assistance of capital sentencing counsel?

In Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 420, 432 (2000), the Court ruled that the provisions that limit the admissibility of evidence in federal habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) do not apply where a habeas petitioner’s failure to develop evidence in support of a claim is due “to the conduct of another or by happenstance.” In other words, the petitioner has not “failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings” under § 2254(e)(2) where he has not lacked diligence in developing the factual support for his claim, including where the fault for that dereliction lies with another or through happenstance. I. Did the lower federal courts violate the rule of Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 420 (2000), by attributing fault for not developing factual support of a claim in state court to Lee where a thorough social history investigation was critical to the ability of Lee’s post-conviction relief (PCR) counsel to establish his claim of ineffective assistance of capital sentencing counsel under Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984), but the state court rejected counsel’s request for the appointment of mitigation specialist Roseann Schaye, who had already contributed pro bono investigative services to Lee and was prepared to continue, in favor of Mary Durand who, due to illness, repeated hospitalizations, and overwork failed to timely perform any mitigation investigation whatsoever prior to the state PCR court’s evidentiary hearing. II. Whether newly unearthed mitigation, which included the compelling expert opinion that Lee, a felony-murderer, did not “act with reckless indifference to the grave risk of death” under Tison v. Arizona , 481 U.S. 137 (1987), and therefore was ineligible for a sentence of death, established prejudice under Strickland to prove the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.