Can a criminal defendant invoke his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation under Faretta after an equivocal request?

Mr# Smith alleges his Sixth Amendment oontstifcutional right to self-representation under Faretta v* California, 422 U.S. 806, 45 h, Ed. 2d 562, 95 S. Ct* 2525 (1975) was violated when the trial court denied his timely unequivocal reguests. Mr* Smith first requested to represent himself with the assistance of co-counsel. 'Hie trial court immediately informed Mr. Smith his attorney will either represent him or not. He subsequently made several clear pro se requests that superseded the initial co-counsel request. Although Mr. Smith argued the unequivocal nature of these subsequent requests to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the Court did not acknowledge or analyse these claims of invocations by Mr. Smith to his right. In its decision to deny a certificate of appealability, the Sixth Circuit reasoned only the initial co-counsel request essentially saying a defendant who makes an equivocal or unclear pro se request can never thereafter invoke his constitutional right under Faretta. presents the following questions.ihe case thus Can a criminal defendant invoke his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation under Faretta after an equivocal request? Did the United States Court of Appeals err by not acknowledging and addressing each one of Mr. Smith's claims of invocation to his Sixth Amendment right under Faretta individually? Was Mr. Smith's Sixth Amendment constitutional right to self-representation violated when the trial court denied his clear unambiguous requests?