Did the Ninth Circuit step outside the bounds of § 2254(d) by considering reasons not found in the CCA's reasoned opinion to determine the reasonableness of that opinion?

Petitioner Michael Fimbres alleges his trial counsel was ineffective for elicit ing testimony that bolstered the state’s theory that he sh ot Frank Taylor , a neighborhood acquaintance, to ensure that he and his gang were not disrespected , rather than out of self -defense. Noting that th is elicited testimony consisted of only “six or seven questions covering less than one page of the reporter’s transcript,” the California Court o f Appeal (“CCA”) reasoned that this “brief exchange” could n’t have prejudice d Fimbres . The Ninth Circuit concluded that this decision for the prejudice prong of Fimbres’s ineffective assistance claim was reasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) —but not for the reason the CCA gave . Instead, the Ninth Circuit determined that the CCA’s decision was reasonable for reasons that the CCA never considered. As this Court has emphasized , however, a federal habeas court deciding whether a state court’s decision was reasonable under § 2254(d ) must “train its attention” on the “ specific reason s” given by the state court for rejecting the prisoner’s federal claim and defer to those reasons if they are reasonable . Wilson v. Sellers , 584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018). Did the Ninth Circuit step outside the bounds of § 2254(d) by consider ing reasons not found in the CCA’s reasoned opinion to determine the reasonableness of th at opinion ?