Andrew D. Anderson v. North Carolina, et al.
Securities
Whether judicial and prosecutorial immunities are consistent with Article III judicial power and constitutional due process
As applied in petitioner ’s case, are the applications of judicial and prosecutorial immunities consistent and compliant with Art. III. Sec. 2. “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States ”? Does the district court err in its findings of facts and application of the law on pages 10-11 under Sec. Ill (A) of the order, and dismisses with prejudice under the doctrine of Sovereign immunity the petitioner ’s claims against Defendants, Office of the Governor of North Carolina, Roy Cooper III. North Carolina Superior Court District 30, North Carolina District Court, Josh Stein, and Office of the Sheriff? (See App. B, P. lOa.-lla.) Did the district court err in its findings of facts and application of the law at the bottom of page 13 of the court ’s ORDER, under Sec. Ill (B) when dismissing with prejudice under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity, Petitioner ’s claims against Defendants Welch, Matheson, Buckner, Phelps, Hughs, 43rd Prosecutorial District, and Office of the District Attorney? (See App. B, P. 18a.) Did the district court err in its findings of facts and application of the law, under section III (C)(4)(f) of the district court ’s ORDER, the district court has found, as a matter of fact, and of law, that the Petitioner ’s claims against Defendants are barred by the doctrine of res judicata for previous claims in state courts against defendants being dismissed? (See App. B, P. 26a.-29a.) Has the petitioner stated sufficiently new facts to state a new claim of actual First Amendment violations and on the same happenings not to be barred by the doctrine of res judicata? Do the life and liberty rights guaranteed by Amend. XIV give way to Governor Roy Cooper Executive Orders 116-121, appended as Appendices L-Q? (See P. 65a.-103a.) Is the exercise of emergency powers by government authorities constitutionally permissible under the U.S. Constitution, and if so, do these emergency powers render the individual constitutionally protected rights, by Amendments to the U.S. Constitution I, IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, X, and XIV null and void during a declared emergency (such as in an administrative courtordered mask mandate or a panicked two weeks to slow the spread)? (See App. R, P. 105a.)