Whether the lower courts erred by holding that any imagined reason for counsel's conduct rendered said conduct beyond review, even on de novo review and under a permissive COA standard

Petitioner Raul Otero Cazares was convicted of the rape of his long -time domestic partner (“Doe”) in a trial where they told very different stories regarding the nature of their relationship , and their financial arrangements were central to both parties’ cases. Nevertheless, the record reflects that Cazares’s trial counsel was unreasonably unprepared to address several check s Doe wrote to Cazares during their relationship , leaving Cazares so blindsided by them that he professed that he was “having a hard time believing [him]self ” on cross examination . On habeas review, Cazares alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. Despite reviewing the claim de novo, the District Court denied the claim and denied a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on the grounds that “any possible reason” for counsel’s conduct insulated that conduct from review. The Ninth Circuit likewise denied a COA. The question presented is thus whether the lower courts erred as a matter of federal law by holding, counter to this Court’s precedent , that any imagined reason for counsel’s conduct rendered said conduct so far beyond review that no reasonable jurist could disagree as to the District C ourt’s resolution of Cazares’s claim, even on de novo review and in light of the permissive standard for receiving a COA ?