For what purposes may courts use facts or events that occurred after the offense to determine the 'reasonable likelihood' of a federal investigation at the time of the offense?

First, in Fowler v. United States , 563 U.S. 668 (2011), this Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a) required the government to prove a “reasonable likelihood” that the defendant’s conduct interfered with communication to a federal officer, as opposed to a state or local officer. Applying Fowler to 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), the Seventh Circuit relied upon the existence of a federal investigation that began weeks after the offense to find a “reasonable likelihood” of a future investigation at the time of the offense. United States v. Sheffler , 125 F.4th 814, 824 (7th Cir. 2025). The Ninth Circuit, on very similar facts, ruled that there was not a “reasonable likelihood” of a federal investigation, instead focusing on facts that transpired at or before the time of the offense. United States v. Johnson , 874 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 2017). For what purposes may courts use facts or events that occurred after the offense to determine the “reasonable likelihood” of a federal investigation at the time of the offense? Second, does the “reasonable likelihood” requirement from Fowler v. United States , 563 U.S. 668 (2011) also apply to offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1519, to safeguard against the same federalism issues raised in Fowler that will arise from the federal prosecution of interference with purely state (or even private) investigations of matters that also happen to be within federal jurisdiction?