Whether an intent to 'harass' or 'intimidate' under the federal stalking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, has an 'ordinary' broad meaning or is limited to true threats by First Amendment principles

No question identified. : QUESTIONS PRE SENTED 1. Whether an intent to “harass” or “ intimidate” under the federal stalkin g statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2261 A, has an “ordin ary” broad meaning or ins tead is limited to true thr eats and by the Firs t Ame ndment principl es in Counterman v. Colorado , 600 U.S. 66 (2023 ) and oth er canons of statu tory con structio n. 2. Whether closing an e-m ail account can constitute the “o bstru ction” offens e in 18 U.S.C. § 1519. i STATEMENT OF RE LATED CASES • United Sta tes v. Ian R. Diaz , No. CR 21-00984 -JLS, U.S. District Court fo r the Central District of Califo rnia. Judg ment entered July 3, 2023 . • United Sta tes v. Ian R. Diaz , No. 23-13 41, U.S. Court of Appeals for th e Ninth Circuit. Judg ment entered January 23, 202 5, rehearing deni ed February 1 3, 2025 . ii TABLE OF CON TENTS Table of authori ties. .iv Intro duction .1 Opinio n below. .2 Juris diction .2 Statuto ry and cons titutio nal prov ision s.2 Stateme nt of th e case .3 Argument. .8 I. The Court shou ld grant r eview to resolve the circuitsplit o n the mea ning of the federal stalki ng statut e, and it should overrul e the Ninth Circuit’s minority vi ew that the term s “harass” and “i ntimidate” in § 2261 A have their pur ported “ord inary” mea nings.8 A. The c ircuits are spli t on the meaning of § 22 61A. .8 B. The Ninth Circuit ’s minority view is wrong. .12 II. The Court sho uld gr ant review to resolv e the question left open in Yates and shou ld hol d that the obs truction offense in § 1519 does not proscribe closing an e-m ail account.. .18 Conclusio n.22