Does the private right of action for trade secret misappropriation created by the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 rebut the presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law?

In 1996, Congress enacted the Economic Espionage Act, which created Chapter 90 of Title 18 and criminalized trade secret theft (18 U.S.C. § 1832). That Act expressly provides for extraterritorial application of “[t]his chapter” (i.e., Chapter 90) only if “an act in furtherance of the offense was committed in the United States.” Id. § 1837. In construing another Title 18 provision that applies to “offenses ,” this Court held that it applies “only to criminal charges” and not “also to civil claims.” Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter , 575 U.S. 650, 653 (2015). “Although the term [‘offense’] appears hundreds of times in Title 18,” not a single one of those instances “actually labels a civil wrong as an ‘offense.’” Id. The next year, Congress enacted the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA) , which amends Chapter 90 of Title 18 to create the civil wrong of trade secret misappropriation and a private right of action for such misappropriation. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b). Th e DTSA did not alter § 1837, which still grants extraterritorial reach only to “offense[s]” under Chapter 90. The question presented is: Does the private right of action for trade secret misappropriation created by the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 rebut the presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law ?