Whether Miranda warnings should be modified to create a rebuttable presumption of involuntariness rather than an irrebuttable rule of law, and whether a reference to counsel during a polygraph discussion constitutes an unequivocal invocation of Miranda rights

is: Because the Fifth Amendment concerns voluntariness, whether Miranda should at the least be modified to an adjudicatory device rather than a rule of law so that a failure of some sort with regard to Miranda creates a rebuttable presumption of involuntariness, allowing admission of the statement if it is demonstrated to be voluntary; that is, not taken in violation of the actual Fifth Amendment. II. Respondent while in custody and after Miranda warnings and agreeing to take a polygraph, asked a detective to call his wife and said, “I’d also like to contact my attorney, so he can arrange for whatever, kind of thing.” The detective asked “Do you want your attorney, then, before you take a polygraph?” and Respondent replied “I want to ask him, like, you know, look, I’m being ii honest, I’m being upfront, you know, you know, and now—I will take a polygraph test, that’s not going to change my mind.” Respondent expressed concern with how the polygraph test would read given his level of anxiety, and the detective briefly explained the polygraph procedure before concluding the interview. The following morning, after Respondent talked to an attorney, the detective asked Respondent if he wanted to take the polygraph and Respondent said he did. He was again given Miranda warnings before and after the polygraph. The State court held that Respondent had unequivocally asserted his Miranda right to counsel. The question presented is: Whether a reference to counsel after Miranda warnings for reasons unrelated to cutting off questions is an “invocation” of the Miranda right to counsel, and whether clarifying police questions concerning the taking of a polygraph to which a reasonable person would not expect an incriminating response constitute further interrogation.