Daniel Del Brumit v. David Rogers, Warden
DueProcess HabeasCorpus Privacy
Whether Congress can render the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek Art. 4 void through state post-conviction proceedings and AEDPA review
In 2020, this Court decided McGirt, and as a consequence, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA hereafter) “recognized that several other Indian reservations in Oklahoma had likewise never been properly disestablished. ” See McGirt v. Oklahoma 591 U.S. 894 (2020) Okla, v. Castro Huerta 597 U.S. 629. 634 (2022) citing Matloff v. Wallace 497P.3d 686 (OCCA. 2021) In the instant case, the OCCA wrongfully employed a State retroactive bar against the immunities of a Choctaw descendant based on McGirt being a new procedural rule. In effect, in order to deny an Indian ’s 14 Amendment immunities in the course of post conviction proceedings, the OCCA usurped Congress to reestablished the effective date of the Choctaw Treaty from 1830 to 2021. Since the OCCA decided Matloffs retroactive bar, nearly four (4) years of challenges to the State common law have come to nothing. On habeas review, the Federal Courts have unjustly neglected Oklahoma Indian Treaty obligations and statuses. In Mr. Brumit ’s case, the U.S. Western District Court of Oklahoma (WDOK hereafter) liberally construed his attack on the State retroactive bar as an attack on his conviction and sentence! and they failed to harmonize the AEDPA with the terms of the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek Art. 4 (hereafter only Choctaw treaty). 28 U.S.C.A. $ 2254. Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, Sept. 27., 1830, Art. IV, 7Stat. 333-334 Additionally, without explanation, the Tenth Circuit opined that the Choctaw Treaty was barred after one year! thereby, in effect, they n have ruled that an Indian can lose immunities without unequivocal expression from the Tribe or Congress. This question is NOT a collateral attack on Mr. Brumit ’s conviction and sentence. Pursuant the 6th and 14th Amendments and the AEDPA , it is Mr. Brumit ’s right to redress the Constitutionality of a State post-conviction proceeding and those procedures involved. U.S. Const. Amend 6, 14 28 U.S.C.A. $ 2254 (e)(1) In this question, Mr. Brumit is seeking to understand the hierarchy of Constitutional law, State post-conviction rulings, Federal AEDPA review, and the obligations and immunities granted in Article 4 the Choctaw Treaty. It is a question of reliance and comity verses preemption and harmonization of law. The Petitioner ’s second question is based on the reliance of State rulings to the benefit of the inmate in AEDPA proceedings. The Oklahoma Courts affixed McGirt to Mr. Brumit when they applied a State retroactive bar centered on McGirt. The Petitioner argued what was good for McGirt is now good for Mr. Brumit. In McGirt this Court recognized that Oklahoma had knowingly and intelligently waived its procedural defenses in order that the reservation question might be resolved. The Western District said Mr. Brumit was not similarly situated to McGirt because (1) the State did not consider Mr. Brumit ’s case when they decided McGirt (2) the issue decided in McGirt was not identical to Mr. Brumit ’s case. Brumit v. Rogers 2024WL4165118 (U.S. W.D. of OK, 2024) Even if that were true, 28 U.S.C.A. $ 2254(e)(1) dictates the reliance of State Court findings on habeas review. Therefore, if the State courts assumed Mr. Brumit to be similarly situated, the federal courts iii must presume the State ruling correct. Addressing this issue, the Tenth Circuit ruled the Oklahoma Courts had not ruled Mr. Brumit “similarly situated ” to McGirt. Brumit v Rogers 2025WL415482 (10th Cir. Feb. 2025) The Petitioner filed a Motion for Rehearing with the Court, with evidence to the contrary, explaining that Oklahoma ’s retroactive bar could not attach except that the State courts assumed Mr. Brumit to be similarly situated to McGirt. The Tenth Circuit denied said Motion. Mr. Brumit is now seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in relation to these two matters. He is desiring the Court to recognize and overturn the State ’s retroactive bar as a usurpation of Congress. He is desiring the Court to verify that the obligations within