Whether the state court's Brady analysis violated due process by improperly relieving the State of its obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence from jailhouse informants

Mr. Wainwright’s jury and sentencer were provided with highly prejudicial information about his role in the crime for which he is sentenced to die. This testimony came from jailhouse informants who—unbeknownst to the jury, the court, or defense counsel —expected a sentencing benefit in exchange for their testimony against Mr. Wainwright. Because the truth was not disclosed until after Mr. Wainwright’s initial federal habeas proceedings had concluded, Eleventh Circuit precedent precludes federal review of his claim that the State violated his due process rights . Without this Court’s intervention, the restrictive application of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) will perversely reward the State for withholding evidence and cause Mr. Wainwright’s claim of constitutional infirmity to be lost. The questions presented are: 1. Should this Court use its power to grant a writ of habeas corpus to a capital defendant who has no other available forum to raise his compelling due process violation pursuant to Brady v. Maryland ? 2. Whether , in the wake of this Court’s decisions in Panetti v. Quarterman and Banister v. Davis, Brady claims discovered after the conclusion of initial federal habeas proceedings may be treated as second -in-time rather than successive petitions, as numerous panels within the federal circuit courts have advocated? 3. Whether the state court’s Brady analysis was contrary to and an unreasonable application of this Court’s due process jurisprudence because it relieved the State of its obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence and instead placed the onus on Mr. Wainwright to discover it ? 4. Whether the state court’s requirement that Mr. Wainwright prove a firm deal existed between the State and its jailhouse informant is contrary to or an unreasonable application of this Court’s clearly established law as articulated in United States v. Bagley , which recognized that the possibility of a reward could be equally or more motivating than a specific sentencing agreement ? 5. Whether the state court’s materiality analysis contravened the cumulative review required by this Court’s longstanding precedent because it failed to consider the impact of the suppressed evidence on Mr. Wainwright’s penalty phase outcome?